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ublic-private partnerships (PPPs) are usually authorized by the legislature as an
innovative method of public service delivery, and funds to support their operations
come from taxation on business premises or special property assessment fees levied
on property owners for different types of improvement activities and services within a
geographic boundary. Under these partnerships government may bring private sector
businesses including nonprofit organizations into the reinvention and management of
projects, while safeguarding the public interest and ensuring efficient delivery of public
services. The major goal of PPPs is to encourage employment, commerce, economic
development, and public welfare in certain areas.
During situations of fiscal crises, urban economic development scholars have argued that
PPPs offer governments an opportunity to partner with private organizations in achieving
public objectives (Ewoh, 2007; Koven & Lyons, 2003; Mitchell, 2001; Morgan, England &
Pelissero, 2007). In view of this argument, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the
PPPs’ processes, financing, and promotion strategies in various projects as well as their
impacts on sustainable economic development in Atlanta and Houston metropolitan areas of
the United States. An undergirding question to be answered in this analysis is why should
any government entity engage in public-private partnerships? To answer this question, the
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paper starts with an overview of PPPs as an economic development tool. This is followed
by an exploration of their governing structures, intergovernmental relations, and
accountability issues as these relate to metropolitan governance. In addition, the paper
concludes with recommendations on successful implementation mechanisms.

An Overview of Public-Private Partnerships and Its Theoretical Framework
In the United States, governments at the national, state, and local levels have partnered with
private corporations and nonprofit organizations to plan, mobilize for public support, and
pay for important social programs, and construction of mutually beneficial infrastructures.
Why should any government entity engage in public-private collaborations? To answer this
question, a historical brief analysis of PPPs is in order here. The PPPs predates the
American Revolutionary war. In 1652, the Boston Water Works Company was the first
private entity to supply drinking water to the United States citizens. In fact, before the
United States independence, there has been a broad range of PPPs established to secure the
nation from foreign invasion as private corporations developed different management
mechanisms that were later used and further developed by the United States Department of
Defense (Ewoh & Dillard, 2003).
The literature has chronicled the proliferation of PPPs through business improvement
districts (BIDs) in the United States and other nations within the last four decades. BIDs
operate under different legal arrangements and are called different names in the United
States, such as community improvement districts (CIDs), municipal management districts
(MMDs), downtown improvement districts, self-help business improvement districts,
special purpose districts, economic improvement districts, to name but a few. In Canada,
they are referred to as business improvement areas, and are known as city improvement
districts in South Africa, and generally called business improvement districts in the United
Kingdom (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008; Fraser, 2007).
Conceptually, the formation of BIDs—also known as CIDs or MMDs—parallels the
rational choice model, according to Morcol and his colleagues (2008, 4-5):
Rational choice theories (public choice, institutional rational choice, polycentrism,
and others) make the fundamental assumption that individuals are actors in
economic and social life who make rational (utility maximizing) decisions, which in
the end benefit all those who are involved. In the theoretical framework of rational
choice, individual preferences are universal and predetermined. The general
normative preference of rational choice theorists is for less external (governmental)
intervention in the decisions of individual, and therefore smaller governmental units
that are ‘closer’ to decisions makers. BIDs fit this definition of smaller and closer
units.
Despite the rational choice theorists’ perspective on government intervention, the opponents
of small governments or shadow governments (e.g., Garreau, 1991, Heckathorn & Maser,
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1987; McConnell, 1966; Sandel, 1996) argue that these units are not only undemocratic, in
terms of governance, but they are potential causes of inter-district inequity because property
owners in low-income neighborhoods may be excluded from receiving supplemental
services due to their inability to pay extra taxes or fees required for the creation of a nested
government.
The proponents of small governments maintain that these types of governance have been
found to be in consonance with the classic polycentric model of local government (see Baer
& Marando, 2001; Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Polanyi,
1951). A polycentric urban area refers to an area with multiple centers, instead of a single
center of monocentric city (McDonald & McMillen, 2011). Normatively, however,
polycentricity is a public policy alternative that encourages balanced and multi-spatial types
of urban networks that are beneficial from socioeconomic perspectives, both for the core
areas and peripheries. As a theory, polycentrism is based on the principle of spatial
organization of cities imbued with a functional division of labor, economic and institutional
integration as well as political cooperation instead of oppression. Baer and Feiock (2005)
contend that polycentric model of governance may be more beneficial in meeting service
preferences than large diverse units of governments. As a result, their formation may
formalize service-level disparities among residents and businesses within cities, and these
disparities might allow services to be geared toward meeting the optimum need of citizens
within the special districts in question (Baer & Feiock, 2005; Briffault, 1999).
Without getting into the debate between the critics and supporters of the analytical
polycentric concept, there are two important questions to be explored in this analysis. First,
what motivates governments to create or encourage business improvement districts?
Second, why are the governing structures or financing mechanisms under business
improvement districts considered to be innovative? The answers to these questions will
avail themselves below with special emphasis on CIDs in Atlanta metropolitan area of
Georgia and MMDs in the Houston metro area of Texas, since these districts share the same
characteristics with business improvement districts (BIDs).
In terms of BIDs’ historic origin, the Bloor West Village BID was created in Toronto,
Canada in 1970, as the first business improvement district. It was the idea of a Canadian
jeweler, Alex Ling, who convinced government officials of the City of Toronto that local
businesses should be empowered to take some control of their local area by improving it
and paying for the improvements themselves to solve the problems of graffiti, litter and
vandalism in the area. Since the city government could not help due to its budgetary
constraints, local businesses levied themselves and contributed money based on the size of
their business to provide extra street lighting, smart street furniture and extra litter
collection.
Consequently, trade and profits increased significantly beyond the money initially spent.
The concept accelerated rapidly across Canada, and in 1974, the first assessment-financed
BID in the United States, known as the Downtown Development District in New Orleans,
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was authorized by the Louisiana State Legislature. Since the 1970s, there has been a
proliferation of BIDs, and the acceleration increased in the 1980s and 1990s. It is estimated
that there are over 1,000 BIDs operating in the North America today, with budgets ranging
from $3,000 to $15 million. In the United States, BIDs are located in 43 states and are most
popular in the nation’s largest cities, including Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles,
New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington,
D.C. Moreover, BIDs are now available in some cities in other countries such as Jamaica,
New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and a few European countries (Steel &
Symes, 2005; Mitchell 2001; Hernandez & Jones, 2008).
The growth of BIDs in the United States as alternative types of innovative organizations is
usually associated with severe economic changes that have been mirrored in Western
Europe. For example, the decline of traditional industries such as steel and car
manufacturing left cities such as Detroit and Pittsburgh in serious economic condition, thus
leading to a decline in the local economic base, high levels of unemployment, a labor force
without the knowledge, skills and abilities, coupled with a substantial number of blighted
neighborhoods and inner city decay (Mitchell, 2001).
Another motivation for the growth of BIDs is that it is backed by public choice arguments
that some public services could be delivered more efficiently and effectively by private
firms, and that public ownership was not necessary in some areas of service delivery in the
United States and other nations. As a result, the shortfall in city governments’ revenue from
the federal government compelled municipalities to embrace BIDs to generate additional
funds for services (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008; Briffault, 1999; Mallett, 1993). Services
usually provided by BIDs include supplementary security, extra street cleaning or garbage
collection, and the promotion or marketing of special events within the district boundaries.
The job of local government is to legally establish a BID organization, with an enabling
legislation from the state legislature, to use as it sees fit in enhancing overall service
delivery. BIDs are, as Houstoun (1997, 38) puts it, “a powerful combination of
ingredients—business self-interest and vision, together with public financing unencumbered
by urban politics.”
There are other explanations for the proliferation of BIDs, at least in the United States,
which are imbued in the American cultural and political factors that influenced the
“enlightened self-interest” of business owners. For example, Monti’s (1999, 245)
observation that “American towns and cities were founded as commercial enterprises” is
key to understanding the history of business influence on municipal government in the
United States. In a country committed to self-help and interest group formation, it is not
surprising that citizens are likely to organize themselves when faced will common
problems. This is essentially obvious when economic interests are involved, as in the case
of homeowners and their associations (McKenzie, 1994; Nelson, 2005), and other
economically motivated situations involving commercial land and business owners. Similar
to homeowners who are interested in preserving and enhancing their property values, placebased businesses have a mutually equal interest not only in promoting their commercial
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interests, but in enhancing the profitability of their business locations (Logan & Molotch,
1987). BIDs formation must be conceptually explored in this context in the United States
(Ewoh & Zimmermann, 2010).
According to Ewoh and Zimmermann (2010), United States started as a unique confluence
of capitalism and democracy, imbued in the concept of private property. BIDs in general,
and particularly community improvement districts (CIDs) in Atlanta, Georgia, as well as
municipal management districts (MMDs) in Houston, Texas, are examples of the longstanding American tradition of self-help and the close affiliation between political rights
and property ownership.
The CIDs of Georgia and MMDs of Texas reflect many of the general characteristics of
BIDs (i.e., public-private partnerships); however they are also different due to the political
culture, the changing economic conditions, and demographics of the states where they are
located. For example, whereas Georgia’s CIDs are constitutionally established local
governments, Texas’ MMDs (and BIDs in many other states such California and New
York) serve as a component of urban governance and administration. In Georgia and
Texas, residents are not allowed to join these types of public-private partnerships; whether
they could form their own has not been examined at this stage. CIDs depend on the
counties/cities to collect taxes since they are already in the business of doing this; it will not
be efficient to do otherwise. Conversely, MMDs taxes are collected through the tax
increment reinvestment zone—a form of tax increment financing. In the United States,
government has always been driven by economic interest groups and business to influence
public policy in their favor through interest group activism. Consequently, business entities
have used the power of persuasion to influence their state legislatures in Georgia and Texas
to authorize them to create their own hidden governments through CIDs and MMDs,
respectively. Since the formation of public-private partnership tends to vary in terms of
processes in Georgia and Texas, this analysis now turns to the discussion of CIDs and
MMDs formation processes, financing and promotion strategies in Atlanta and Houston
metropolitan areas.

CIDs Formation Process, Governance, and Financing in Georgia
There are thirteen community improvement districts (CIDs) in Georgia. These districts
include urban—downtown and in-town—CIDs in metropolitan Atlanta such as Downtown,
Midtown, and Buckhead. Initially, Georgia CIDs were created in the suburbs to manage the
explosive growth and the resulting traffic congestion in and around suburban shopping
malls and business centers. In view of this, suburban CIDs have different priorities and
operate somewhat differently from their urban counterparts.
The Cumberland CID was the first district created in 1988 as a public-private self-taxing
entity in Atlanta’s northwest market known as Cumberland. It is located at the junction of
interstates 75 and 285 in Cobb County. The CID includes the Cumberland Mall—Galleria
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area, also called the “Platinum Triangle,” originally founded in 1973 and labeled “a classic
of the Edge City genre” (Garreau, 1991, 172). Since its creation, the district has leveraged
$100 million in local assessment into projects worth billions of dollars that are either
completed or under construction (Cumberland CID, 2010, 2).
In terms of formation process, a few common legal procedures are required in the United
States for the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs). An enabling legislation is
enacted by the state legislature. This is followed by a petition from a certain, state-specified
proportion of property owners in the proposed district to the local government. The local
government formally approves a resolution creating the district and appoints members of
the board, which in some cases may be elected in adherence to statutory procedures
established by the state legislature. Both the local government and the new district draw up
a cooperation agreement which delineates services to be provided by the BID.
In Georgia, the process follows these general legal procedures although, instead of a single
state-wide enabling law for BIDs as done in Texas or elsewhere, an individual enabling
legislation is enacted for each local jurisdiction (county or city) in which the BID will be
located, however there are minor variations between these laws. The only important
difference is that some of the jurisdictions have sunset provisions while others may not
because of their enabling law.
The Georgia constitution in Article 9, section 7, defines counties and municipal
corporations, and provides a clause on CIDs. It outlines two conditions for the creation of a
CID such as a city/county resolution and the consent of a simple majority of the commercial
property owners who must also represent at least 75 percent by value of all real property
within the proposed district. Once these conditions are satisfied, the district is ready for
operation through a memorandum of agreement between the governing body of the local
jurisdiction and the leaders of the proposed CID. The local government’s governing
authority adopts a resolution creating the district and a copy of the resolution is filed with
the secretary of state and the Department of Community Affairs. As soon as the board
officials are elected, the state constitution mandates that a representative from the local
government must be on the board, which must enter into a cooperation agreement with the
county or city.
The state constitution authorizes local governments (city or county) to approve or reject the
creation of CIDs. It is important to note here that only one CID has been rejected due to
some local political disagreement. Although Georgia’s political culture makes it unlikely
for a local government to reject the petition of 51 percent of property owners with 75
percent of the property valuation in an apparently significant area of the local jurisdiction, it
can happen. The way this usually succeeds, however, is not difficult. In order to meet the
requirement of 75 percent of the property valuation in the planned district, the organizers of
the proposed CID will first persuade the other largest property owners in the area. With this
large amount of property tax already committed in principle, it is not difficult to persuade
the remaining number of property owners required to obtain the simple majority because of
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the potential reduction in their tax liability for the prospective improvements in the district.
For example, in the Cumberland CID, it only took seven property owners to cover the
required 75 percent property valuation; and of the total of 160 property owners, they only
had to persuade another 74 to achieve the needed majority of 81.
Furthermore, there are property owners who may be unwilling to partake in the formation
process. These are usually absentee owners, remote real estate trusts such as pension funds,
and big-box stores such as Wal-Mart. In some cases, business leaders seeking to organize
the district may resort to some creative gerrymandering, because the properties must be
contiguous. For instance, during the Town Center CID formation process, there existed a
small hole in the middle of the site of a Wal-Mart store but all the properties surrounding it
are, of course, contiguous. CID organizers also tend to limit their districts to the confines of
a single jurisdiction, one county or city. This is why, for example, the large Perimeter
Center has two independent CIDs, one in Fulton County and the other in DeKalb County
with the same Executive Director and staff members for both (collectively known as the
Perimeter CIDs) to save money.
The majority of Atlanta metropolitan CIDs are in mixed areas. Residents are ineligible to
join CIDs because they are not assessed. Nonetheless, the potential problem that this may
create as it pertains to the district’s land-use planning authority forces some districts to
invite residents to any planning sessions and seek their feedback as done by Cumberland
and Evermore CIDs. The wide array of functions that these districts have been
constitutionally granted makes them virtually fully general-purpose governments. The
general purpose government nature of Georgia’s CIDs can be seen through the range of
activities the state constitution allows them to implement such as follows:
1. Street and road construction and maintenance, including curbs, sidewalks, street
lights, and devises to control the flow of traffic on streets and roads;
2. Parks and recreational areas and facilities;
3. Storm water and sewage collection and disposal systems;
4. Development, storage, treatment, purification, and distribution of water;
5. Public transportation;
6. Terminal and dock facilities and parking facilities; and
7. Such other services and facilities as may be provided for by general law.
(Georgia Constitution, Article 9, Section 7, paragraph 2).

In terms of governance, each CID is governed by seven or nine member boards, six or eight
of whom are elected by the CID constituents, with the chair appointed by the county. For
example, in the City of Atlanta, there is one appointee each for the mayor, the president of
the city council, and the chair of the city’s finance committee. In Cobb County, the
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appointed chairs must be selected from the CIDs’ property owners and the elected board
members must be property owners. It is pertinent to note here that the election system is
not exactly democratic, and is based on property ownership. Of the six, three are elected by
electors, noncontiguous owners of property within the CID, and three by equity electors,
property owners who cast votes equal to each $1,000.00 value of all owned real property
within the CID. That is, each property owner votes once as an elector (one person—one
vote) and as many times as permitted by the property value (one vote for each $1,000.00
value of said property). This process helps to allow those with the largest investment to
have the largest influence (Ewoh & Zimmermann, 2010).
Regarding financing mechanisms, the major source of revenue for BIDs is self-assessment
among commercial property owners; which is the reason for their existence. While Georgia
CIDs use self-assessments as a main source of revenue, what significantly distinguishes
them is their ability, as governmental entities, to leverage large amounts of public monies
from the federal, state and local governments to fund projects in their districts in the form of
grants. Other sources of funds include special assessment bonds for public use
infrastructure and voluntary tax exempt donations from businesses. In the famously
business-friendly political culture of the state, governments are more than willing to partner
with CIDs in essentially funding their desired projects. In view of this, the case of
Georgia’s CIDs surely reflects the blurring of the line between public and private sectors in
the public policy process.
Georgia CIDs leverage a substantial amount of funds from governments through direct
investments and grants. For illustrative purpose, the Perimeter CID “has leveraged $18
million in self-imposed business property taxes into $500 million in transportation
improvements” (Lightsey, 2008, 47). Now celebrating its 22-year history, the Cumberland
CID has collected more than $100 million from business owners to leverage billions of
dollars from government projects that are either completed or under construction
(Cumberland CID, 2010, 2). While there is no standard method of calculating leverage
ratios (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008), CIDs leverage their funds with federal and state
monies at ratios up to 10 to 1, enabling the community leaders to pursue a project they
value for the economic development of their districts.
The issue of accountability as it relates to business improvement districts’ operations is
always controversial. In fact, the controversy depends solely on the autonomy given to
these districts, which tends to vary from one jurisdiction to another. Some scholars (Morcol
& Zimmermann, 2008; Briffault, 1999; Garodnick, 2000) maintain that since these districts
are more autonomous in their operations beyond their enabling law, state and local
governments may not easily hold them accountable in most situations. The reduction of the
state and local governments’ authority over public-private partnerships such as these has a
serious public policy implication. According to Daniel Garodnick (2000, 1756), the
oversight issue “is a double-edged sword for BID advocates. On the one hand, to serve a
‘limited purpose,’ BIDs are forced to argue that they are directly accountable both to their
constituencies and to public officials. On the other, BIDs are successful because of their
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inherent flexibility and their ability to sidestep the city bureaucracy to accomplish goals.”
The majority of CIDs in Atlanta metropolis are dominated by business leaders or their
representatives, and they may act without democratic accountability. As discussed earlier,
residents are not taxed or eligible to serve on the CID board.

MMDs Formation Process, Governance, and Financing in Texas
The process of business improvement district formation in Texas, known as municipal
management district, is closely similar to what is obtainable in other jurisdictions nationally
as earlier discussed. Each district is established by an act of the Texas State Legislature
under the terms and provisions of Article III, Section 52 and Article XVI, Section 59 of the
Texas Constitution, and is governed by Chapter 375, Local Government Code, and a special
state enabling legislation. The primary purpose is to promote employment, commerce,
economic development, and public welfare in the commercial areas of municipalities. In
Houston, Texas, community based organizations can apply to create municipal management
districts (MMDs) in their neighborhoods. In order to qualify, the neighborhood must be
devoted to commercial development and business activity. MMDs can be created in two
ways: a) through formal application to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ), and b) through a special state bill with the help of local state legislator.
All the Houston 12 MMDs were established by a special legislation in the Texas Legislature
which exempted them from meeting the TCEQ’s requirements, such as a petition (signed by
50 property owners), a statement of purpose, a legal description (boundaries of proposed
district), and a public hearing—for petitioner to provide notice to all property owners for 30
days (City of Houston, 2009).
On governance, an MMD is administered by an elected board of directors and a
strong board is required for it to be effective. The MMD board of directors usually consists
of property and business owners, and elected as well as appointed government officials. The
board is responsible for setting policies and overseeing operations under the management of
a company. Board membership varies in size, typically from 7 to 30 directors, and meets
either monthly or quarterly.
Regarding funding, property taxation and bonds are two major approaches of funding
municipal management districts in Texas. Every district operates under five-year service
plans financed by assessments for both services and major capital improvements. Services
and improvements funded through tax assessments, ad valorem taxes, or impact fees are
subject to the following procedures:

2011 JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS ● WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jekem/vol3/iss1/15
DOI: 10.7885/1946-651X.1047

PAGE

279
10

Ewoh: Public-Private Partnerships in Atlanta and Houston Metropolitan A

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN ATLANTA AND
HOUSTON METROPOLITAN AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES

1.

A district may levy assessments upon petition of the owners of property
consisting of 50 percent or more of the assessed value, or 50 percent or
more of the surface area of the property in the district requesting a
service plan, which may be imposed on single-family residential
property.

2.

A public hearing must be held before a district’s assessment is levied.

3.

A commercial property in a district may be taxed if it is approved by
the district’s voters in an election.

Moreover, the payment of all or a portion of all costs incurred in an improvement project or
services, in some cases, is accomplished through the second method of funding, that is,
through the issuance of bonds. These bonds must be payable from or secured by ad valorem
taxes, assessments, impact fees, revenues, grants, gifts, contracts, leases, or any
combination of these funding mechanisms. State law requires the bonds to be approved by
the Texas Attorney General as well as the affected municipality. Although future levies
must be approved by all the stakeholders, they must not be too high to keep total collection
cost as low as possible within the constraints of satisfactory equity and economic impact.
As long as there is an in-built process transparency, modern information management
systems such as geographic information systems can be deployed to make good quality
annual updates possible and equitable (Mikesell, 2007).
In terms of accountability, unlike community improvement districts in Georgia, Texas’
municipal management districts are required to file annual reports with the Comptroller of
Public Accounts. The Comptroller’s office already coordinates the development activities
of the local governments, as a result, has the legal mandate to monitor MMDs’ spending to
ensure not only the proper accountability of public funds, but that MMDs’ projects and
services are designed to improve the welfare of the people in concert with the primary
purpose of their creation. Local government authorities (both Harris County and the City of
Houston) can hold MMDs within their jurisdictions accountable through their oversight
function and by their presence on the MMDs’ boards.
The issue of accountability as earlier discussed applies to MMDs’ operations as well. Just
like Georgia, the majority of Houston MMDs are dominated by business owners or their
representatives, and in some instances, citizens within these districts worry about the
privileged position of businesses in urban governance and administration (for a discussion
on the position of business in policy making, see Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993).
Nonetheless, it is expected that the introduction of citizen participation in the board
membership would remedy some of these problems. Cordial collaborations between local
governments and districts within their jurisdictions will allow both to understand their
operations and institutional capacities so that they can achieve more through a win-win
public policy situation due to their transparent partnerships.
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PPPs’ Initiatives, Intergovernmental Relations, and Promotion Strategies
This section takes a closer look at urban economic development and their promotion
strategies through public-private partnerships in Atlanta and Houston metropolitan areas.
While the community improvement districts (CIDs) in Georgia do not have to collaborate
with one another, they usually compete for federal and state funds, and this competition has
compelled them to engage in healthy partnerships. In fact, district officials have come to
appreciate the importance of large economies; that is, their alliance with other districts can
show strength in numbers and offer them more clout with the state assembly. This type of
alliance yields much dividend when they take on projects that will benefit the entire
metropolitan area, at no cost to the legislature because the districts attract their own
revenues. The utility of partnerships has been shown either through some completed or
ongoing transportation projects as well as infrastructure improvements explored below.
In Atlanta metropolitan area, for examples, the Perimeter Community Improvement
Districts (PCIDs) in partnership with DeKalb County have completed a streetscape project
along Perimeter Center Parkway. Part of this project includes bike lanes, wide sidewalks
with brick pavers, shade trees, decorative crosswalks, pedestrian signals, street lights,
decorative mast arms and pedestrian enhanced lighting throughout the corridor. It is
important to note here that this project connects with the newly completed $34.9 million
Perimeter Center Parkway Flyover Bridge creating a north/south bike connection within the
PCIDs. The streetscape construction was done by Baldwin Paving Company at a winning
bid of $7.2 million, and was collaboratively funded by the Atlanta Regional Commission’s
Livable Centers Initiative Grant Program, Governor Sonny Perdue’s Fast Forward Georgia
Regional Transportation Authority Bond Program, DeKalb County Government and the
PCIDs’ self-tax for infrastructure improvements (Jackson, 2008).
An ongoing road project awarded to Mathews Contracting Company on February 4, 2009 is
designed to put a half-diamond interchange at Georgia 400 and Hammond Drive so that
drivers can go northbound from Hammond onto Georgia 400 and southbound from GA 400
onto Hammond. Part of the project includes replacing the bridge—making it higher and
longer—so that Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) may, on the basis of a
feasibility study, add more lanes to the highway underneath in the future. GA 400 is a toll
road built by the state government a few years ago to accommodate the exceedingly rapid
growth in the most desirable center of metro Atlanta’s “favored” (north Fulton County,
Roswell, Alpharetta, etc.), which bisects the quarter that is delimited by I-75 on the
Westside and I-85 on the Eastside. The major goal of the project is to relieve some of the
congestion at GA 400 and I-285, one of the most congested chokepoints in Georgia. The
project will cost $18 million, and PCIDs had committed $5 million, a crucial factor in its
approval by the GDOT (Hart, 2009).
The Cumberland CID was created in 1988 to reduce traffic congestion by addressing the
need for access ramps at Akers Mill Road and Interstate 75. That goal was later broadened
to include better mobility and easy access to all four quadrants of the Cumberland Galleria
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area, divided by Interstates 75 and 285. Cumberland CID developed a master road plan
consisting of a five-mile Cumberland Boulevard loop road to enhance connectivity.
Construction commenced on the first phase of the project in 1991, and five years later, work
started on the $85 million Kennedy Interchange, a key component that provides direct
access from Cumberland Galleria office parks to Interstate 75. The Cumberland Boulevard
loop road was completed in 2003, 15 years later at a cost of $300 million. In 2009, drivers
now have access to all parts of Galleria without using interstates or U.S. Highway 41
(Cumberland CID, 2008, 6-7).
Furthermore, Cumberland CID is completing its road and transit initiatives by advancing
$41 million in streetscape and trail improvement (started in 2010) through a $17 million
investment to improve pedestrian connections and the area’s aesthetics. This projects
include decorative pavers at intersections, landscaping, widening sidewalks and street
furniture such park benches—with help from federal and state revenues, area residents are
beginning to discover a more sustainable transit-oriented development and livable
community initiatives (Cumberland CID, 2010, 10). The Commuter Club initiated by the
Cumberland CID leaders in 1996 continues to provide various cost-effective transportations
for commuters in the area that improve area traffic, and reduce harmful pollutants. In 2010,
it is estimated that about 1.5 million vehicle miles were removed from the roadway, 785
tons of pollutants were eliminated and moore than 41,000 total clean commute logs were
submitted (Cumberland CID, 2010, 7)
In the Houston metropolitan area of Texas, for examples, the Uptown District, also known
as the Harris County Municipal District No. 1, is located around Post Oak Boulevard and
the Galleria, the largest and most prestigious shopping mall in the City of Houston. It
operates with an annual budget of over $3 billion, under the supervision of a 12-member
board of directors. Due to its role as a high-end fashion and hotel district, it is the Houston
equivalent of San Francisco’s Union Square and Los Angeles’ Beverly Hills. Uptown
District boundaries are well defined. It is bounded by Woodway Drive to the north, the I610 (West Loop) to the east, U.S. Highway 59 to the south, and Chimney Rock Road to the
west. Uptown is also known for its skyline, and is the Houston’s second largest business
district, and the nation’s 17th largest—about the size of Denver and Seattle downtowns
(Uptown, 2011a).
The highest achievement of Uptown is the construction of the 899-foot-tall Philip Johnson
designed landmark, the Williams Tower (known as the Transco Tower until 1999). At the
time, it was believed to be the world’s tallest skyscraper outside of a central business
district. It is also home to approximately 2,000 companies, ranging from small- to largesized commercial businesses, consisting of a variety of diverse industries. The area hosts
approximately 200,000 office workers and shoppers daily and more than 22 million visitors
from all over the world each year (Uptown Houston, 2011a).
Another important achievement of the district is its traffic management program. In 2006,
the district added a police officer to patrol the area during high-volume traffic hours seven
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days a week. The officer is responsible for observing the traffic flow within the area and
taking action (with a public safety vehicle equipped with extra gasoline and tools to assist
commuters) when an incident impedes area mobility and accessibility. In fact, the
completion of IH 610-West Loop reconstruction, from US 59-Southwest Freeway to IH 10Katy Freeway is a big plus to the area’s traffic management. A $235 million Uptown Local
Street Improvement Program is being implemented to improve local accessibility (Uptown
Houston, 2011b).
Since ensuring continued economic success is one of the district’s goals, the Uptown
District is leading a strategic effort to identify and secure opportunities to grow the area’s
commercial base by building and maintaining partnerships with real estate brokers,
developers, property managers as well as corporate tenants. These stakeholders are now
using Uptown’s website as a resource and tool to market the area and, of course, to facilitate
leasing, development as well as investment (Uptown Houston, 2011c).
Also, the Houston Downtown Management District (HDMD)—known as Downtown
District—boundaries are represented largely by the freeway ring around the City of
Houston’s central business core that covers approximately 1,173 acres of downtown. It has
access to tax-exempt financing, immunity from torts, as well as other benefits. HDMD is
governed by a-30 member board of directors, as initially indicated in an earlier section,
representing property owners, managers and tenants in downtown. Several city department
heads serve in an ex-officio, non-voting capacity on the board. HDMD is staffed under
contract with Central Houston, Inc., a professional management company, and began its
revitalization efforts in the mid-1990s. As a result, HDMD was instrumental in facilitating
various public and private projects that helped to transform downtown Houston for more
than ten years now. The Downtown District started by setting important goals with
improving the quality of life as an underlying theme. Significant projects completed by
HDMD include: Texas Avenue Streetscape Improvements; area enhancements associated
with Metro’s Downtown Transit Streets Improvements Project; and the City of Houston’s
Cotswold 2000 Project (Central Houston Inc., 2011).
A seven and half mile light rail line completed in January 2004 that connects the University
of Houston Downtown, downtown, Midtown, the Museum District, Hermann Park, the
Texas Medical Center and Reliant Park was opened. The HDMD partnered with the Main
Street Market Square Redevelopment Authority to provide necessary enhancements of the
rail line, which included sidewalks and pull outs, brick pavers, special streetlights, drinking
fountains, additional landscaping, and street clock at the cost of $10 million. The cost of
the entire Metropolitan Transit Authority rail project was $324 million (Downtown District,
2011).
Also in 2004, the southeast section of downtown, generally bounded by Main Street to the
west, Rusk to the north, US-59 to the east, and IH-45 to the south, pedestrian walkways
were upgraded through the Southeast Quadrant Streetscapes Improvements Project, a joint
effort between the City of Houston and HDMD. Improvements completed in this area
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include new street pavements, improved drainage, sidewalks, trees and landscaping,
removal of overhead utilities, and traffic signal upgrades at a total cost of $8 million (the
list of other projects either completed or ongoing are available online, see Downtown
District, 2011). Today, downtown Houston is booming as a result of a substantial number
of public-private investment that allowed developers to spend over $4 billion in the mid1990s to transform downtown into a commercial city center. Beginning in 2007, over $3
billion development activities are under implementation with over 30 projects including
civic buildings, commercial office towers, residential and infrastructure (Central Houston
Inc., 2008). While the downtown Houston has benefited from the renewed wave of
investment in the area, the lesson learned here is that public and private partnership has
helped to create a common set of principles and goals to ensure that development in the
district is pedestrian-oriented and transit-supportive; thus creating a win-win situation that
helps in attracting more interests in urban design and economic development practices that
can be emulated by other districts.
All the districts explored in this analysis have their own websites and real estate
professionals make use of these outlets in reporting current information pertaining to the
office activity in their geographic areas. The inventory of available office spaces are usually
reviewed online by corporations planning on relocating either to Atlanta or Houston. Both
CIDs and MMDs work collaboratively with other levels of government, and nonprofit
organizations in their jurisdictions in accomplishing their missions.

Conclusions
Public-private partnerships through community improvement districts (CIDs) or municipal
management districts (MMDs) are self-taxing and legally sanctioned self-help publicprivate corporations created by the legislature to provide services to enhance the local
business environment. As business improvement districts, CIDs and MMDs fulfill a variety
of developmental functions: 1) They function as sustainers of existing development, 2) they
take a promotional role by engaging in marketing efforts to consumers, and 3) they fulfill a
development role by promoting economic growth and attracting new businesses within their
jurisdictions. These functions provide answers to the undergirding question raised earlier in
this analysis. That is, why should any government entity engage in public-private
partnerships? Although some of the metropolitan Atlanta CIDs and Houston metro MMDs
reviewed in this analysis have tried to fulfill these three functions, most do target a narrower
set of activities as dictated by both the organizational features of either the CIDs or MMDs
themselves, and the environmental context of their respective geographic areas.
By creating a partnership among property owners, business, the community, and local
government, both CIDs and MMDs represent a tool through which to enhance the visibility
of a certain geographic area to conduct business. Whereas the vision of what CIDs and
MMDs can do in Atlanta and the Houston area is promising, their capacity to function
efficiently and effectively, as sustainers, promoters, or developers of an area must be
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understood within the context of their organizational structures, stakeholders, and their
respective political and socioeconomic conditions. For CIDs and MMDs to succeed as
important development tools in urban or suburban areas, development officials must have a
proper understanding of the stakeholders to ensure their adequate representation in terms of
citizen participation. In fact, adequate citizen participation will help to counteract both the
inter-district inequity and democratic concerns raised by opponents of the polycentric
model of governance as discussed earlier.
Additionally, local government officials must be able to work with community
improvement districts or municipal management districts in their jurisdictions in identifying
and analyzing the needs of all stakeholders according to local context, so that CIDs’ or
MMDs’ board members can target resources to accomplish identified needs in a way
consistent with efficiency and effectiveness in urban governance and administration.
Although CIDs and MMDs are usually successful due to their flexibility, municipal
governments must furnish an oversight mechanism to monitor their operations in order to
assure proper accountability.
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